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CABBAGES AND KINGS: BRIDGING THE GAP FOR MORE 
EFFECTIVE CAPACITY-BUILDING 
CHARLES E. TUCKER, JR.* 
 
"The time has come," the Walrus said, 
"To talk of many things: 
Of shoes—and ships—and sealing-wax— 
Of cabbages—and kings—1 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
With apologies to Lewis Carroll, in the context of 
contemporary rule of law stability and reconstruction operations, 
including those being undertaken in Iraq and Afghanistan, “the 
time has come . . . to talk of many things”; not simply of kings, but 
also of cabbages and all things between. 
 
* Major General (Retired) Charles E. Tucker, Jr., United States Armed Forces, 
Executive Director, World Engagement Institute (WEI), Chicago, Illinois.  
The WEI is one of a small number of academically based research centers that link 
scholarship, outreach, and educational activities with the design and management 
of institutional capacity building, human rights and rule of law programs 
throughout the world.  WEI’s senior staff have created projects in Latin America 
and the Caribbean, the Middle East, Europe and Central Asia covering diverse 
subjects including international criminal law, indigenous rights, gender justice, 
trafficking, and post-conflict justice.  Specific projects produce policy-oriented 
research, engage in large-scale human rights documentation and analysis, train 
grassroots organizations in human rights advocacy, and provide capacity 
building for judges, lawyers, and others.  These projects create links between 
academics and the United Nations, regional human rights institutions, foreign 
universities, NGOs and international organizations connecting WEI’s faculty, 
staff, and students with partners around the world.  I would like to thank 
International Human Rights Law Institute of DePaul University Interns Praveen 
Ayyagari and Christine Varghese for their research assistance. 
1 LEWIS CARROLL, The Walrus and the Carpenter, in THROUGH THE LOOKING 
GLASS AND WHAT ALICE FOUND THERE 64 (1917). 
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Nation-building.  State-building.  International Humanitarian 
Interventions.  Phase IV Post-Invasion/Post-Liberation Operations.  
Counter-Insurgency “Hearts and Minds” Operations.  Post-
Conflict Stability & Reconstruction Operations (“SRO”).  No matter 
how “it” is labeled, the United States, its coalition allies, and the 
broader “international community” have all been in the “business” 
of “it” since World War II.  More significantly, since the onset of 
“international community” combined, joint and inter-agency 
operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina, they have been increasing 
their engagement in “it.”2  In support thereof, untold numbers of 
conferences examining the implications of “it” have been held; 
thousands of barrels of ink, reams of paper, and terabytes of 
electronic data have been spent in both learned and unlearned 
treatises examining “its” conduct; “revolutionary” military 
doctrines pertaining to “it” have been established, reestablished, 
and disestablished; scads of “tactics, techniques & procedures” 
(“TTPs”) operationalizing “it” have been drafted and ignored; and 
innovative interagency agencies attempting to coordinate “it” have 
been concocted, underfunded and largely allowed to wither. 
Astonishingly, for all the effort and commentary expended on “it,” 
the success of “it” has not been a common theme—or end state.3 
This paper argues that one of the main reasons recent “it” 
efforts (i.e. SRO)4 have largely been unsuccessful is because most of 
 
2 JAMES DOBBINS ET AL., AMERICA’S ROLE IN NATION-BUILDING: FROM GERMANY 
TO IRAQ 1–2 (2003).  
3 See generally Robert Hoekstra & Charles E. Tucker, Jr., Adjusting to 
Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations, 2 PRISM 13, 18–19 (2010), available at 
http://www.ndu.edu/press/lib/images/prism1-2/2_Prism_13-26_Hoekstra_Tucker.pdf 
(giving some reasons why these operations generally failed).  
4 For the remainder of this paper, the authors will refer to the operations in 
question as “stabilization and reconstruction operations” (“SRO”).  The 
Department of Defense (“DoD”) defines stability operations as, “an overarching 
term encompassing various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted 
outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national 
power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, provide essential 
governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and 
humanitarian relief.”  Paragraph 4(d) of the DoD Instruction further notes, “[t]he 
Department shall assist other U.S. Government agencies, foreign governments 
and security forces, and international governmental organizations in planning 
and executing reconstruction and stabilization efforts, to include: (1) Disarming, 
demobilizing, and reintegrating former belligerents into civil society. (2) 
Rehabilitating former belligerents and units into legitimate security forces. (3) 
Strengthening governance and the rule of law. (4) Fostering economic stability 
and development.”  See Dep’t Defense Instruction, Directive 3000.05, paras. 3–4, 
(Sept. 16, 2009), available at http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres 
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the intellectual effort expended by the “international community” 
on post-1995 SRO capacity-building in general—and rule of law 
engagements in particular—has been on the supposedly big issues; 
 
/pdf/300005p.pdf; see also NORA BENSAHEL ET AL., IMPROVING CAPACITY FOR 
STABILIZATION AND RECONSTRUCTION OPERATIONS 3–4 (2009), available at 
http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs /2009/RAND_MG852.pdf. 
The family of efforts grouped together under stabilization and 
reconstruction encompasses a range of overlapping missions that are 
themselves components of a broad range of different engagements and 
Approaches. Stabilization, for example, generally refers to the effort to 
end conflict and social, economic, and political upheaval. Stability in 
each of these spheres is necessary for effective reconstruction because 
without it, any gains will be short-lived.  
Stabilization, thus defined, is one component of a wide range of possible 
operations. For example, stabilization can be carried out as part of an 
intervention. Indeed, it can be the express purpose of an intervention to 
end violence. It is also crucial in the aftermath of combat operations, 
which may have intentionally or unintentionally helped spur additional 
conflict. Stabilization is also an accepted component of 
counterinsurgency operations because efforts to gain local support, 
which are so central to counterinsurgency, generally require ending 
violence and upheaval. Counterterrorism operations may also include a 
stabilization component. For example, if these operations take place in an 
unstable environment, stabilization may be critical to gathering 
intelligence. Definitionally, stabilization is part and parcel of post-
conflict operations and necessary for any sort of nation-building efforts 
to take place.  
Reconstruction refers to the process of developing or redeveloping 
structures that permit sustainable self-government, social and economic 
development, and security. Reconstruction picks up where stabilization 
leaves off in any and all of the sorts of operations just described. This is 
why stabilization is a necessary precondition for reconstruction: Without 
it, subsequent efforts are not sustainable. Although some reconstruction 
and stabilization efforts coincide, the former cannot succeed without the 
latter.  
In the context of violent conflict, these two families of tasks play different 
roles. Stabilization is, by definition, the key to ending violence. 
Reconstruction, by contrast, is believed to help prevent a return to 
violence by addressing longer-term drivers of violent conflict. Although 
reconstruction and stabilization tasks are distinct, they affect each other 
in important ways. Once basic security has been established, 
reconstruction tasks are critical to eliminating many of the factors that 
can drive further violence. By ensuring that a society and an economy 
grow, reconstruction gives people and their leaders the stake in a 
nonviolent future that is crucial to building that future. Chapter Two 
further defines the specific tasks that fall under stabilization and 
reconstruction missions.    
Id. 
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the “kingly” issues.  Such oft-examined “kingly” issues include: the 
(debatable) wisdom of imposing (or, if one’s sensibilities prefer, 
“facilitating”) federalism, confederalism, or regionalism; the 
proper drafting and/or redrafting of constitutions; the putative 
benefits of creating “big D Democracy;” the movement of certain 
societies from centralized economies to free market economies; the 
well-publicized and well-resourced conduct (pre-mature or 
otherwise) of national elections; the lofty (and largely unmet) goals 
of implementing “post-conflict” (sic) criminal justice (“PCJ”) 
mechanisms; and the absolute imperative of establishing (and 
actively implementing) “international community” “exit 
strategies.”  What are not often examined (or appropriately 
resourced), however, are the most appropriate means and methods 
of facilitating day-to-day local/regional governance and rule of 
law capacity-building mechanisms; i.e., the “cabbage” matters. 
Admittedly, the “international community’s” impetus to be—
and the learned “academy’s” impetus to support—the Thomas 
Jeffersons (“Constitutional-ists”), Governor Morrises (“Election-
ists”), Susan B. Anthonys (“Suffrage-ists”), Justice Jacksons (“War 
Crimes Just-ists”), Adam Smith’s (“Free Market-ists”), or even 
General MacArthurs (“Enlightened Occupier “Govern-ists”) of 
one’s generation are understandable.  Furthermore, while such 
lofty efforts and aspirations may (arguably) be laudable, the fact is 
that such matters absorb an inordinate amount of the 
“international community’s” learned SRO discourse—and resources.  
Meanwhile, what largely goes unheralded and unresourced, is the 
other side—the more critical side—of stability and reconstruction 
operations, to wit: the systematic, “day-to-day,” “boots on the 
ground,” “lawyers at the dock,” “teachers in the class,” “bottom-
up” capacity-building approach to effectuating effective civil 
societies, establishing local governance and achieving rule of law.  
It is this side of capacity-building—the “cabbages” side—that must 
be emphasized, evaluated, empowered and resourced if 
“international community” stability and reconstruction operations 
are to be successfully undertaken.5 
 
5 See generally Carolyn Bull, Building the Rule of Law under UN Transitional 
Administration 2 (UN, Policy Brief No. 7, Nov. 7, 2007), available at 
http://unu.edu/publications/briefs/policy-briefs/2007/pb07-07.pdf. 
[A] central concern of actors engaged in attempting this transformation 
has been the lack of priority accorded to rule of law issues relative to 
other more visible and immediate state-building demands.  A second, 
related concern is that of continued disappointing results in attempts to 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol32/iss5/7
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Simply put, local governance capacity-building military 
personnel (e.g. Civil Affairs personnel), foreign service civilian 
personnel (e.g. personnel from the U.S. State Department’s Office 
of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization6), and 
governmentally-secured private contractors, as well as local 
governance capacity-building (vice service providing) NGOs and 
universities, (not to mention capacity-implementing “host-nation” 
governments and citizens) require significantly more resourcing, 
assistance, and informed advice from their “international 
community” colleagues on how to successfully grow “cabbages”.  
It is true that military personnel largely provide security and quell 
destabilizing forces.  However, when backed into a “counter-
insurgency” corner, and/or when “mission creep” otherwise 
dictates, they also often engage in “Civil Affairs” SRO 
implementation.  Likewise, Private Military Contractors and 
(some) civil society organizations do everything and anything else, 
from building physical infrastructure to training law enforcement 
personnel, judges and prosecutors (i.e., they engage in “justice 
sector reform”).  Non-governmental Organizations (“NGOs”) 
provide direct support, including providing food, aid, healthcare, 
and (on occasion) education to local populations.7  And – when 
 
implement rule of law reform. . . .  UN transitional administrations have 
sought primarily to establish the rule of law through state-based 
enforcement mechanisms: establishing formal rules of behaviour with 
the force of law (the legal system) and constructing coercive state 
structures to enforce those laws (state organisations such as judiciaries, 
police forces and prisons). This approach has enjoyed only limited 
success in establishing the rule of law.  
Id.  Citing previous UN-supported rule of law operational deficiencies, Bull 
proposed a number of recommendations including:  
1) Building the rule of law should not be equated automatically with 
establishing state-based coercive mechanisms such as state law, 
judiciaries and police systems; 2) Giving real substance to rule of law 
institutions may depend primarily on internal processes of change; 3) 
Post-conflict disrupted states are a hostile intervention environment, to 
which the liberal normative template of UN state-building may be 
fundamentally ill-suited; 4) Rule of law promotion is a long-term 
enterprise ill-suited to truncated interventions; and 5) Front-end 
planning is critical.   
Id. at 5–7. 
6 See, e.g., Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, U.S. 
DEP’T. OF STATE, http://www.state.gov/s/crs/. 
7 See Hoekstra & Tucker, supra note 3 (providing a broader discussion of the 
role such entities play in rule of law operations). 
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allowed - universities can provide long-term sustainable tools for 
creating free societies.8  The “cabbages” work performed by all 
these groups is critical to the successful implementation of any 
SRO capacity-building engagement.9  However, while “kingly” 
efforts, such as drafting of constitutions and the prosecution of war 
criminals are endlessly emphasized, implemented and debated – 
particularly within the “academy”—the critical work of growing 
local governance and civil-society rule of law “cabbages” goes 
largely unsupported, thereby explaining why our post World War 
II nation building efforts have widely missed the mark. 
The fact that local governance and rule of law capacity building 
receives little intellectual support from the “international 
community” in general, and “the academy” in particular, does not 
mean it does not occur.  To the contrary, while some academics 
endlessly debate what the “international community” should be 
doing about supposedly heady matters of central state governance, 
out of necessity, personnel “on the ground” are already “doing” 
the less heralded (albeit far more critical) “stuff” of actually 
creating, training, and implementing day-to-day local governance 
and civil society rule of law.  However, because of a dearth of 
support, there is little doctrine to guide them in such critical 
efforts. There is little academic analysis to sustain them. Instead, 
their efforts go largely unsupported—at least in part—because their 
“international community” colleagues and academic friends are 
otherwise focused on supposedly more “serious matters.” 
Notwithstanding this situation, effective SRO (“it”) requires effective 
local governance and rule of law capacity building10 —and this, in turn, 
requires that intellectually sound ideas be incorporated into day-to-
day operations.  The “bottom line” is that successful “it” requires 
 
8 See, e.g., INT’L HUMAN RIGHTS LAW INST., DEPAUL UNIVERSITY, 
http://www.law.depaul.edu/centers_institutes/ihrli/projects/ (describing the 
international rule of law programs). 
9 Joe Klein, It’s Time for Extreme Peacekeeping, TIME, Nov. 23, 2003, at 25. 
10 See Bull, supra note 5, at 5. 
Adherence to the rule of law as a value system appears to depend on the 
extent to which local actors accept it as legitimate and commit voluntarily 
to it. In this respect, power dynamics may have a profound influence . . . 
[T]he legitimacy of the rule of law is undermined where it is not 
perceived as compatible with pre-existing social values, where local 
actors do not have a sense of ‘ownership’ over key processes or where 
the new system does not deliver desired and reliable outcomes. 
Id. 
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dialogue among those who are “thinking” about the issues, those 
who are “doing” the actual work of capacity-building, and those 
who are “receiving” the assistance.  Thus, successful SRO requires 
that more attention be directed toward the local governance and 
rule of law efforts of capacity-builders on the ground—the 
military, the private contractors, the NGO workers, the civil society 
implementers, the local citizens—so they may incorporate effective 
capacity-building doctrines and techniques into their own work 
and do so in order to achieve successful end states. 
2. A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF CAPACITY BUILDING 
For better or worse, since World War II the “international 
community” has routinely been engaging “in the business” of 
intervening in the affairs of less developed, under-developed or 
non-developed states.  In so doing, it has employed various actors 
to oust putatively oppressive regimes, “reform” economies, and 
attempt to (re)create stronger civil societies.11   Achieving success 
in such endeavors has not proven easy.  One reason for this has 
been that the state “clients” with whom we have been dealing have 
routinely been, “lack[ing] the institutional capacity to implement 
and enforce policies . . . driven by an underlying lack of legitimacy 
of the political system as a whole.”12  The “international 
community’s” “weak state” clients also routinely, “commit human 
rights abuses, provoke humanitarian disasters, drive massive 
waves of immigration . . . attack their neighbors and are breeding 
grounds for terrorism.”13  Equally as significant has been the fact 
that the “international community” has routinely deemed “weak 
states” to be a threat to global peace, security, and prosperity, thus 
necessitating the utilization of significant “kinetic” resources to 
quell and reform their militaries, para-militaries and/or militias.14 
Clearly, such factors have proven to be formidable obstacles.  They 
have also sapped the desire and/or ability of the “international 
community” to deal with the nuts-and-bolts issues associated with 
systematically encouraging local civil society development. 
 
11 DOBBINS ET AL., supra note 2, at xvii. 
12 FRANCES FUKUYAMA, STATE-BUILDING: GOVERNANCE AND WORLD ORDER IN 
THE 21ST CENTURY 96 (2004). 
13 Id. at 92–93. 
14 Chester A. Crocker, Engaging Failing States, 82 FOREIGN AFF. 32, 33–34 
(2003). 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
TUCKER_FINAL.DOC 10/11/2011  10:38 AM 
1336 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 32:5 
Current “international community” SRO is somewhat different 
from that undertaken by the Allies in the 1940s and 50s.  In the 
wake of total war, Germany and Japan’s respective physical 
infrastructure and economies were left in shambles, their political 
institutions de-legitimized, and their citizens in dire need of the 
most basic of provisions.  However, both countries had significant 
pre-war experience with successful local governance.  Clearly, this 
basic local governance capacity needed to be reconstituted, but it 
did not need to be created from scratch.  Thus, the basic ability of 
Germany and Japan to reconstitute their own local governance 
structures allowed the Allies to concentrate on undertaking the 
formidable tasks of physical infrastructure redevelopment, 
economic redevelopment and national level political-military 
reform.  Given this, after the fall of the Third Reich, the Allied High 
Commission (comprised of US, French, British, and Soviet actors) 
occupied a defeated Germany with the goal of implementing 
national level democracy reforms, demobilizing the army, 
rebuilding the national economy and eliminating the vestiges of 
Germany’s Nazi past.  Admittedly, the occupying powers 
implemented their national level democratic reforms through the 
systematic implementation of a “bottom up process,” whereby 
they exorcized the reach of previous political parties at the local 
level and then, gradually, expanded more democratic influences to 
the regional and national levels. Equally as admittedly, it was only 
after these efforts proved to be successful—fully three years after 
Germany’s unconditional surrender—when the country held its 
first national elections.15  But the fact remains the Allies had 
“something” to work with.  This “something” was an ability of 
Germany to reconstitute its basic local governance capacity. 
Given their ability to focus on national level structures, Allied 
forces were able to concentrate on demobilizing the armies and 
training German soldiers on constabulary duties.  Simultaneously, 
certain Allied governments injected German factories and mines 
with resources and funds to spur economic development.  At the 
local level, the Allies, while promoting national level democracy 
and freedom of expression reforms, vetted elementary school 
teachers, replaced pro-Nazi classroom textbooks, and monitored 
newspapers to remove any Nazi sentiment that would filter 
through.16 More globally, by 1949, the Allies approved a 
 
15 DOBBINS ET AL., supra note 2, at 8–9, 16. 
16 Id. at 10, 16. 
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constitution and transferred autonomy to the Federal Republic of 
Germany.17  Again, however, the Allies did not need to create 
newspapers, schools, or local governance structures from scratch.  
They “simply” had to exorcise the vestiges of National Socialism 
from largely pre-existing governance structures. 
In the meantime, in the immediate post-war aftermath, Japan 
retained even more of its sovereignty—and its existing national 
and local governance structure—than did Germany.  The Supreme 
Allied Commander operating in Japan did so behind the fiction of 
a grant of authority from the Emperor.  Thus, in theory if not 
practice, the Occupier, acting through the Emperor, garnered 
internal legitimacy.  Regardless, because of the preexistence of 
Japan’s internal governance capacity, by early 1946 the Japanese 
government was able to draft and approve a new constitution.18 
While broadly reformative in scope, the creation of the new 
constitution was enabled by the fact that Japan had a history of 
effective local governance capacity.  This left the Far Eastern 
Commission (i.e. the Allied group formed to oversee the 
reconstruction process), free to provide basic foodstuffs while the 
Country returned to its feet, as well as to concentrate its democracy 
promotion efforts on emphasizing serious educational reform.  US 
military and governmental units were sent to schools to enforce 
new policies that deemphasized nationalism, militarism and 
anything that could spark hyper-nationalist sentiments.19  Again, 
the Allies did not have to create these local and national 
governance structures from scratch.  They “simply” had to exorcise 
the vestiges of militarism from largely pre-existing governance 
structures. 
With the advent of “humanitarian interventions” in the 
Balkans, the “international community” midwifed a new era in 
state building SRO.  Simply put, the political-military interventions 
occurring after the end of the end of the Cold War required far less 
by way of military force than had been seen in the past, but far 
more by way of in-depth interventions into the basic governance 
structures of “client states.”  This was particularly true with regard 
to creating the governance and legal structures needed to 
ameliorate widespread human rights and minority-population 
 
17 Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Structures and Standards for Political Trusteeship, 8 
UCLA J. INT’L L. & FOREIGN AFF., 385, 395 (2003). 
18 Id. at 396. 
19 DOBBINS ET AL., supra note 2, at 25–50. 
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abuses occurring within failing or failed states.20  Thus, markedly 
different from the Allied occupations in Germany and Japan, the 
“international community’s” various “coalitions of the willing” 
routinely intervened in the internal affairs of sovereign countries 
because of the lack of local and national governance capacity, or 
because the presence of corrupt leaders, ethnic tensions, and/or 
complicated national histories were dismantling any vestiges of 
political legitimacy.  Significantly, the skill sets and focus necessary 
for interveners to successfully build the local governance capacities 
necessary to deal with such deficiencies was severely lacking.  
Instead, the wrong people (e.g. centralist constitutionalists) were 
routinely sent at the wrong time (i.e. immediately after an armed 
intervention) to implement the wrong national level (vice local) 
programs.  A case in point is the “international community’s” 1995 
“humanitarian intervention” into Bosnia and Herzegovina (“BiH”). 
Clearly, pre-intervention human rights abuses in BiH were 
grave, and civil governance mechanisms either non-existent or 
ineffective.  Thus, in the face of such a governance vacuum, 
Serbian and Croatian militias undertook a systematic campaign of 
ethnic cleansing against Bosnian Muslims and did so in order to 
obtain political strongholds within various regions of the former 
Yugoslavia. As a result, countless civilian casualties, massive 
population displacements, and large-scale food shortages ensued. 
To ameliorate this crisis, the “international community” negotiated 
an end to the conflict, as memorialized in the 1995 Dayton 
Accords.21  Thereafter, the “international community,” as 
ensconced in the Office of the High Representative (“OHR”) and 
the Implementation Force (“IFOR”) (a NATO-led multinational 
force), entered BiH as “a political trustee,”22 thereby taking over 
security and administrative functions for the benefit the people of 
BiH.23  In so doing, the expressly stated purpose of this 
 
20 FUKUYAMA, supra note 12, at 97; see also William B. Wood, Post-Conflict 
Intervention Revisited: Relief, Reconstruction, Rehabilitation, and Reform, 29 FLETCHER 
F. WORLD AFF. 119, 120 (2005). 
21 Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Dec. 14, 1995, 35 I.L.M. 75 
(1996) [hereinafter Dayton Accord]; RICHARD HOLBROOKE, TO END A WAR 289–90 
(1998); see also Carl Bildt, Holbrooke’s History, 40 SURVIVAL 187, 187–91 (outlining 
Holbrooke’s role in negotiating the Dayton Accord). 
22 Perritt, supra note 17, at 398. 
23 Dina Francesca Haynes, Introduction, in DECONSTRUCTING THE 
RECONSTRUCTION: HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE RULE OF LAW IN POSTWAR BOSNIA AND 
HERZEGOVINA xv, xviii-xix (2008). 
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reconstruction and stabilization capacity-building effort was to 
democratize the country by addressing the refugee/internal 
displaced person crisis, ameliorating the human rights abuses of 
the civilian population, promoting peace among the various ethnic 
groups, bringing human rights abusers/war criminals to justice, 
and rebuilding BiH as a free market force within the global 
economy.24  For whatever their arguable merit, such goals were 
markedly different in nature and scope than the Allies’ post-war 
goals in Germany and Japan. Specifically, such goals meant that 
the “international community” was not only signing-on to secure 
the peace in BiH, but it was also signing-on to engage in a nation-
wide vetting of corrupt influences, as well as fundamentally 
restructuring the operations of various largely dysfunctional or 
non-functional local governance structures.25  Despite this fact, the 
“international community” acted as it had in the past and did so by 
focusing on “kingly” issues, including (prematurely) holding 
national elections, drafting a (non-workable) confederal 
constitution, and moving to establish an international criminal 
court with responsibility for prosecuting alleged war criminals.  All 
the while, such core “cabbage issues,” such as helping to set up 
non-discriminatory inter-ethnic school systems, focusing on 
property claims issues, and/or enforcing refugee/IDP relocation, 
went largely unaddressed.    
The High Representative and others in the “international 
community” reputedly used the Dayton Accords as a template for 
their structural stabilization and reconstruction of the country.  
Notwithstanding this contention, the OHR’s primary contribution 
to reconstructing BiH was to initially institutionally create a weak 
form of political trusteeship for itself.26   However, even though 
OHR was initially charged with general oversight, coordinating, 
and reporting duties, by 1997, when it became apparent that local 
officials were not meeting the goals established by the Dayton 
framework, the High Representative aggressively moved them 
aside, stunted the further development of local governance 
 
24 DOBBINS ET AL., supra note 2, at 92–100. 
25 Dayton Accord, supra note 21, at Annex IA. 
26 Dina Francesca Haynes, The Deux Ex Machina Descends: The Laws, Priorities 
and Players Central to the International Administration of Post-Conflict Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, in DECONSTRUCTING THE RECONSTRUCTION: HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE 
RULE OF LAW IN POSTWAR BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA 3, 8 (Dina Francesca Haynes 
ed. 2008). 
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structures, and assumed greater administrative governance 
authority for itself.  In other words, rather than enhance local 
governance capacity, OHR ultimately assumed a centralized 
national-centric SRO role for itself.27 
In the meantime, the United Nation’s International Police Task 
Force (“UN/IPTF”) began monitoring and training the BiH 
national police force.28  However, before this effort could even 
hope to become marginally effective - and well before local 
governance structures could be built and assume some degree of 
functionality - the “international community” induced BiH to hold 
its first national level post-war “democratic” elections.  
Widespread ethnically based bloc voting ensued.29 Soon thereafter, 
without waiting to implement an effective economic policy to back 
it up, the “international community” induced BiH to establish a 
new currency.  High inflation ensued.  At about the same time, the 
“international community” failed in its efforts to facilitate and 
coordinate the safe return of about one million displaced persons.30  
As a result, widespread ethnically based violence re-ensued.  Thus 
today, one could hardly call Bosnia and Herzegovina an 
“international community” success story. 
In 1999, immediately on the heels of the “international 
community’s” botched “humanitarian intervention” in BiH, 
NATO, acting on behalf of the “international community,” 
launched an air campaign to ameliorate grave human rights abuses 
occurring between Serbs and Albanians in Kosovo.  This military 
campaign came to an end in June 1999 when Serbian President 
Milosevic accepted NATO’s settlement terms.31  As part of the 
settlement, the “international community” accepted a mandate to 
politically intervene in the internal governance affairs of Kosovo.  
As a result, NATO assumed responsibility for all security aspects 
of the “humanitarian operation,” while the UN was entrusted with 
overseeing all capacity-building projects.  As at least one 
commentator has noted, Kosovo became the “zenith of UN-
 
27 The IPTF was mandated to monitor, advise, and train Bosnian police but 
had no executive authority to investigate, arrest, or perform other police 
functions.  See ROBERT M. PERITO, THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE WITH POLICE IN PEACE 
OPERATIONS 50–51 (2002). 
28 Id. 
29 Haynes, supra note 26, at 14, n.21. 
30 DOBBINS ET AL., supra note 2, at 99, 104. 
31 Id. at 111–12. 
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sponsored political trusteeship.”32  And yet, this effort SRO also 
largely failed to produce viable fruit.  One reason for this is that 
when Serbian governance officials abandoned the territory, Kosovo 
was left with virtually no civil governance administrative 
capability.  Accordingly, UN personnel were required to set up 
and oversee the administration of the region. Thus, the UN High 
Commissioner for Refugees (“UNHCR”) and certain international 
NGOs undertook a concerted effort to tackle a massive housing 
and refugee crisis.  They did so, however, by directly providing 
goods and services to the people of Kosovo.  In the meantime, with 
regard to Kosovo’s crippled economy, the EU injected massive 
amounts of money into the region and attempted to “reform” the 
national banking system.33  In fact, Kosovo received more financial 
assistance from the “international community” than any other 
post-World War II reconstruction effort.  Whatever else might be 
said of this effort, it was not local-Kosovar-centric.  In fact, scholars 
have likened the presence of the “international community” in 
both Kosovo and BiH to the British Raj since so many of the 
security, economic, administrative, and humanitarian projects they 
directly administered were undertaken by foreigners.34  As a result, 
success in Kosovo has proven elusive.35 
Enter Operation Enduring Freedom (“OEF”) and the global 
war on terrorism (“GWOT”).  Before the initiation of OEF, 
Afghanistan was a tribal confederacy with state institutions so 
weak the Taliban, a non-state actor, yielded most of the political 
influence within the country.36  The problems inflicting 
Afghanistan then—and now—were many.  Despite this, after 
international security, the imposition of democracy was the 
 
32 Perritt, supra note 17, at 401. 
33 DOBBINS ET AL., supra note 2, at 114, 123–24. 
34 Dina Francesca Haynes, Lessons From Bosnia’s Arizona Market: Harm to 
Women in a Neoliberalized Post-Conflict Reconstruction Process, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 
1779, 1807 (2010); see also Fukuyama, supra note 12, at 103. 
35 For example, despite the fact that Kosovo declared independence from 
Serbia in 2008, its status has not yet been recognized by key powers, such as 
Russia.  Further, Kosovar democracy building has had mixed results.  Corruption 
and organized crime are rampant.  Ethnic conflicts between the Serbs and 
Albanians fester and cause unrest.  Some talk of partitioning the area—part of it to 
Serbia and the rest to independent Kosovo—to subdue ethnic hostilities.  
Therefore, as of now, the status of Kosovo remains unclear.  See STEVEN WOEHREL, 
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS21721, KOSOVO: CURRENT ISSUES AND U.S. POLICY (2010), 
available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RS21721.pdf. 
36 Fukuyama, supra note 12, at 101–02. 
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primarily articulated purpose of OEF.  Human rights abuses—
particularly those faced by women—were also specifically to be 
addressed.  The Taliban had stripped females of most rights; the 
country had little freedom of expression or religion; and the law of 
the land was a repressive form of fundamentalist Shari’a.  Thus, in 
short, OEF’s articulated humanitarian goals were to secure equal 
rights for all, address the plight of millions of displaced Afghans, 
and provide the most basic of provisions to the populace.37 As of 
today, these goals have largely gone unmet. 
Since 2001, the Coalition has used the Bonn Agreement as a 
legal framework for the democratization of Afghanistan.  In 
express departure from the BiH Dayton Accords, provisions 
specifically addressing human rights and gender rights were 
included as a part of the Agreement.  Under the Bonn Agreement, 
the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (“UNAMA”) was 
charged with general oversight of the governance and rule of law 
capacity-building process.38  In the meantime, the U.S. military 
established a civil-military task force—a “Provisional 
Reconstruction Team” (“PRT”)39—to, “provide immediate 
humanitarian assistance to the local populace” and provide for 
coordination among the other international civilian groups.40  
Other countries divided capacity-building responsibilities among 
themselves: Germany was in charge of police training; Italy was 
entrusted with training the judiciary; Japan with disarmament; and 
the U.K. responsible for the anti-Opium campaign.41  Unlike 
Kosovo, where the OHR was ultimately given broad 
administrative authority over reconstruction, UNAMA’s authority 
under the Bonn Agreement was to enable local representatives—i.e. 
loya jirgas—to form local transitional government teams and to do 
 
37 DOBBINS ET AL., supra note 2, at 129, 131–32. 
38 Id. at 142. 
39 “PRTs are the primary mechanisms through which the international 
community delivers assistance at the provincial and district level in Afghanistan. 
As noted by USAID, ‘As a result of their provincial focus and civilian and military 
resources, PRTs have a unique mandate to improve security, support good 
governance, and enhance provincial development.  The combination of 
international civilian and military resources . . . allows the PRT to have wide 
latitude to implement their mandate.’”  See Hoekstra and Tucker, supra note 3, at 
18 (citing U.S. AGENCY FOR INT’L DEV., http://afghanistan.usaid.gov/en 
/Page.PRT.aspx). 
40 DOBBINS ET AL., supra note 2, at 140. 
41 Larry P. Goodson, The Lessons of Nation-Building in Afghanistan, in NATION 
BUILDING: BEYOND AFGHANISTAN AND IRAQ 145, 149 (Francis Fukuyama ed. 2006). 
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so within the first six months of UNAMA’s mandate.42  Thereafter, 
democratic elections were to be to be held within two years of the 
establishment of the loya jirga.43 
As has been previously noted by commentators, 
notwithstanding the local governance provisional safeguards 
contained in the Bonn Agreement, the “international community” 
has - once again - largely failed to successfully implement a local 
governance approach to its governance and rule of capacity-
building SRO.   One reason for this is that, from the beginning, the 
PRTs, “were imperfectly realized, haphazardly implemented, and 
inadequately resourced. They were also not doctrinally integrated 
with U.S. coalition partners.”  In fact: 
“We still find ourselves struggling to adequately define 
their mission and doctrine, let alone appropriately resource 
them. This undoubtedly helps explain the predicament in 
which we find ourselves. Therefore, one lesson that should 
be internalized from our experience in Afghanistan is that 
for optimal effectiveness, coordinated response 
mechanisms utilized during conflicts . . . and political crises 
need to be institutionally recognized, doctrinally 
supported, adequately staffed, sufficiently trained, and 
appropriately resourced. Simply put, to be effective, SRO 
coordination mechanisms cannot be an afterthought . . . 
[C]lear institutional mechanisms and parameters must be 
established—and articulated—before initializing SROs.” 44 
 
Meanwhile, Operation Iraqi Freedom was designed as a 
primarily U.S.-led preemptive war against Iraq.  Thus, it did not 
initially receive broad support from the “international 
community.”45  Regardless, the war in Iraq had the potential of 
proceeding more effectively than had coalition interventions in 
countries such as Afghanistan.  One reason to have been somewhat 
optimistic was that, unlike Afghanistan, Iraq had working local 
governance institutional structures in place prior to the US 
intervention.  It also possessed a valuable commodity to help pay 
 
42 DOBBINS ET AL., supra note 2, at 142–43. 
43 Goodson, supra note 41, at 157. 
44 Hoekstra & Tucker, supra note 3, at 19. 
45 DOBBINS ET AL., supra note 2, at 167. 
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for these governance structures, to wit: oil.46 Despite this, upon 
undertaking the post-invasion (i.e. “Phase IV”) of the operation, 
the U.S. needlessly dismantled many existing Iraqi local 
governance structures and left itself in the unenviable position of 
later having to reconstruct these structures.  In the meantime, 
during the reconstruction process, the occupying powers created 
the Coalition Provisional Authority (“CPA”), a transitional 
occupying governance structure designed to oversee the interim 
Iraqi General Council compromised of representatives from Iraq’s 
diverse ethnic groups.  However, rather than concentrate on 
reconstructing the aforementioned dismantled local governance 
structures, the CPA primarily concentrated its reconstruction 
efforts on the creation of a new constitution, as well as building 
national level state institutions and finding WMDs.47 It did so to its 
detriment.  In fact, as at least one observer has noted, America’s 
SRO intervention in Iraq was, a “Fiasco.”48 
 
3. A DIALOGIC APPROACH TO CAPACITY BUILDING 
I like to watch the way the elephant walks, the way it puts its foot 
down. It puts its foot down with respect for the Earth. It doesn’t fight 
the Earth, it respects it and keeps its balance. 
–John Marin49 
 
I have always been fond of the West African proverb: ‘Speak softly 
and carry a big stick; you will go far.’ 
–Teddy Roosevelt50 
 
 
46 Fukuyama, supra note 12, at 101. 
47 Jennifer Stilt, Islamic Law and the Making and Remaking of the Iraqi Legal 
System, 36 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 695, 695–704; see also Dan E. Stigall, Refugees 
and Legal Reform in Iraq: The Iraqi Civil Code, International Standards for the Treatment 
of Displaced Persons, and the Art of Attainable Solutions, 34 RUTGERS L. REV. 1, 1 
(2009). 
48 THOMAS E. RICKS, FIASCO: THE AMERICAN MILITARY ADVENTURE IN IRAQ 
(2007). 
49 MARTHA TEDESCHI & KRISTI DAHM, JOHN MARIN’S WATERCOLORS: A MEDIUM 
FOR MODERNISM 173 (2010). 
50 NATHAN MILLER, THEODORE ROOSEVELT: A LIFE 337 (1992). 
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Small is beautiful. 
–E.F. Schumacher51 
As powerful members of the “international community,” the 
United States and its coalition allies should be mindful of Marin’s 
admonition that, as “elephants,” when we put our foot down we 
must do it with respect.  Or, with deference to Teddy Roosevelt, 
because we carry a big stick, we should speak (or walk) softly with 
regard to our foreign interventions, as well with regard to what we 
do after we intervene.  And yet, despite occasional reminders from 
some of our colleagues in the “international community,”52 the 
hereinabove review of recent history demonstrates we have not 
always walked softly or with respect.  Instead, seemingly oblivious 
to our past blunders, we have repeatedly intervened in the affairs 
of others, exclusively marshaled limited resources around “kingly” 
matters, and done so without adequately resourcing “smaller,”53 
“softer,”54 more respectful, programs designed to address the 
“cabbage” issues pertinent to daily life.  Admittedly we, as 
members of the “international community,” should intervene (i.e., 
“put our foot down”) to help avert crises where and when we 
can,55 but we must do so in a way that respects the very societies, 
humanity, and culture of the people for whom we are 
intervening.56  We must also be ever mindful of our limitations.  
 
51 E.F. SCHUMACHER, SMALL IS BEAUTIFUL: ECONOMICS AS IF PEOPLE MATTERED 
(1973). 
52 See generally Press Release, Secretary-General, Secretary-General Presents 
his Annual Report to General Assembly, U.N. Press Release GA/9596 (Sept. 20, 
1999), available at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/1999/19990920 
.sgsm7136.html (noting the importance of the UN and its charter in an 
increasingly globalized world). 
53 SCHUMACHER, supra note 51, at 1 et seq. 
54 JOSEPH S. NYE, JR., SOFT POWER: THE MEANS TO SUCCESS IN WORLD POLITICS 
1–32 (2004). 
55 For example, when addressing his vision of the use of American power, 
President Clinton noted, “[t]he United States cannot and should not try to solve 
every problem in the world, but where our interests are clear and our values are 
at stake, where we can make a difference, we must act and we must lead.”  THE 
CLINTON FOREIGN POLICY READER: PRESIDENTIAL SPEECHES WITH COMMENTARY 182 
(Alvin Z. Rubinstein et. al. eds. 2000); see also NINA SERAFINO, CONG. RESEARCH 
SERV., RL33557, PEACEKEEPING AND RELATED STABILITY OPERATIONS: ISSUES OF U.S. 
MILITARY INVOLVEMENT 5 (2006) (citing CONG. RESEARCH SERV. CRS REPORT 94-805 
F, THE USE OF FORCE: KEY STATEMENTS BY WEINBERGER, SHULTZ, ASPIN, BUSH, 
POWELL, ALBRIGHT, AND PERRY 3 (1995) (listing factors to consider when deciding 
whether or not the U.S. should engage forces abroad)). 
56 As noted in the current U.S. National Security Strategy: 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
TUCKER_FINAL.DOC 10/11/2011  10:38 AM 
1346 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 32:5 
Thus, we in the “international community” need to watch more, do 
less, and act with care. 
The impetus to intervene apparently stems from a belief—
widely held within the “international community” —that it has the 
capacity not only to intervene militarily in intractable disputes, but 
also the capacity to help build or rebuild societies.57  However, as 
 
[w]here governments are incapable of meeting their citizens’ basic needs 
. . . the consequences are often global….  To advance our common 
security, we must address the underlying political and economic deficits 
that foster instability, enable radicalization and extremism, and 
ultimately undermine the ability of governments to manage threats 
within their borders and to be our partners in addressing common 
challenges.  
. . . We have also learned that the effectiveness of these efforts is 
profoundly affected by the capacity of governments and the political will 
of their leaders. We will take these constraints into account in designing 
appropriate assistance strategies and will facilitate the kind of 
collaboration that is essential—within our government and with 
international organizations—in those instances when we engage in the 
difficult work of helping to bring conflicts to an end. 
THE WHITE HOUSE, NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY 26–27 (May 2010), 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_security_s
trategy.pdf [hereinafter 2010 National Security Strategy]. 
57 See U.N. Secretary-General, Implementing the Responsibility to Protect, U.N. 
Doc. A/63/677 (Jan. 12, 2009) (detailing the emerging human rights concept of 
“Responsibility to Protect” (R2P)).  The Secretary-General’s report was prepared 
with the assistance of the Secretary-General’s Special Adviser on issues related to 
the responsibility to protect, Edward Luck. Luck was appointed in February 2008 
to consult with Member States on the best approach for implementing the 
Responsibility to Protect (R2P). The report specifically notes, in a section entitled 
“Pillar Two: International assistance and capacity-building” that: 
“‘the international community should, as appropriate, encourage and 
help States to exercise this [responsibility to protect] responsibility’. . . 
‘we also intend to commit ourselves, as necessary and appropriate, to 
helping States build capacity to protect their populations from genocide, 
war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and to 
assisting those which are under stress before crises and conflicts break 
out’. These provisions suggest that this assistance could take one of four 
forms: (a) encouraging States to meet their responsibilities . . . ; (b) 
helping them to exercise this responsibility . . . ; (c) helping them to build 
their capacity to protect . . . ; and (d) assisting States ‘under stress before 
crises and conflicts break out’ . . . . While the first form of assistance 
implies persuading States to do what they ought to do, the other three 
suggest mutual commitment and an active partnership between the 
international community and the State.” 
Id. ¶ 28 (quoting G.A. Res. 60/1, ¶¶ 138–40, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/1 (Oct. 24, 
2005), available at http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/files/2005%20World 
%20Summit%20Outcome%20Document.pdf. 
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noted herein, this has not proven to be true.  Thus, if it is to 
continue intervening and undertaking SROs, the “international 
community” must develop an adequate “international capacity” to 
appropriately provide governance and rule of law “capacity-
building” assistance.58  To do so, members of the “international 
community” must share their “lessons learned” and “capacity-
building tools with one another.  They must train together.  They 
must create effective combined, joint and inter-agency capacity-
building doctrine.  They must enter into a more coherent dialogue 
with one another—particularly with regard to what “works” and 
what does not.  Most importantly, they must engage “the 
academy” in a credible dialogic approach whereby continual 
discourse is fostered not only between academics and policy 
makers, but also between academics and “nuts-and-bolts” 
capacity-building actors.  In short, “the academy” needs to become 
more relevant not only to one another, but also to the day-to-day 
“capacity-builders” who are actually undertaking the very difficult 
“business” of stability and reconstruction.  Such an approach 
would not simply make academics available to answer, correct, 
silence, or extend each others’ previous work, but would also 
enable them to inform and continually be informed by the previous 
—and present—work of capacity-building implementers.59  
Unfortunately, successful governance and rule of law capacity-
building does not lend itself to simple solutions; it does not lend 
itself to easy imposition mechanisms; it does not lend itself to 
simple training modules; and it certainly does not lend itself to 
previously oft-asserted academic pronouncements advocating the 
type of “Central-ist,” “National-level-ist,” “Constitutional-ist,” 
“Election-ist,” “Suffrage-ist,” “War Crimes Just-ist,” “Free Market-
ist,” “Enlightened Occupier Govern-ist” approaches applied in the 
past.  Thus, a new, pragmatic, “small is beautiful,” academic-
implementer-academic dialogic approach must be encouraged and 
 
58 Accord 2010 National Security Strategy, supra note 56, at 14. 
To succeed, we must update, balance, and integrate all of the tools of 
American power and work with our allies and partners to do the same . . 
. . We must invest in diplomacy and development capabilities and 
institutions in a way that complements and reinforces our global 
partners. 
Id. 
59 See generally the essays of M.M. Bakhtin, reprinted in THE DIALOGIC 
IMAGINATION: FOUR ESSAYS BY M.M. BAKHTIN (Michael Holquist ed., Caryl Emerson 
& Michael Holquist trans. 1981). 
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brought into play vis-à-vis complex governance and rule of law 
capacity-building SRO engagements. 
 
4. BUILDING THE RULE OF LAW 
In addition to capacity, the impetus to intervene also implies a 
core belief by the “international community” that it has the desire 
to enable or enhance reliable relationships between world actors.  
If this is true, then one way to ensure relational reliability is to 
enhance—or where missing, build—the rule of law.  This said, 
developing rule of law societies is an ends rather than a means.  
Thus, building the rule of law requires more than simply applying 
a mechanistic training approach, and it certainly requires more 
than a top-down imposition of constitutions and national level 
laws.  The “bottom line” is that societal rule of law does not grow 
organically through centralized, top-down, interventions.  Instead, 
it must be systematically developed from the bottom-up, it must be 
nurtured, and it must be sustained.60  Simply put, building the rule 
of law cannot be an after-thought—or a cynical short-term “exit 
strategy” mechanism.61  Instead, in any successful SRO capacity-
building endeavor, “cabbage”-issue related governance and rule of 
law capacity-building must be core elements of the business.62 
Frankly, there is a dearth of learned discourse on the most 
appropriate pragmatic approach(es) to undertake when building 
the rule of law.  This said, what scholarship is available is not 
particularly helpful to implementers on the ground.  For example, 
theoretical academic debates on whether the “international 
community” should focus on formalist structural approaches, or 
take comprehensive substantive approaches (i.e., importing values 
into rule of law that are somewhat based on international 
consensus) do not particularly help implementers decide whether 
to concentrate on imposing centralized national level laws (as was 
 
60 JANE STROMSETH ET AL., CAN MIGHT MAKE RIGHTS?  BUILDING THE RULE OF 
LAW AFTER MILITARY INTERVENTIONS 181 (2006). 
61 Gideon Rose, The Exit Strategy Delusion, 77 FOREIGN AFF. 56, 56–57 (1998). 
62 Although scholars have yet to arrive at a consensus of exactly what “rule of 
law” means, Richard Fallon has proposed three values of rule of law that provide 
a starting point for discussion.  That is, rule of law: 1) protects people against 
anarchy; 2) it allows people to plan their affairs with confidence because they 
know the legal consequences of their actions; and 3) it protects people from the 
arbitrary exercise of power by public officials.  STROMSETH ET AL., supra note 60, at 
69–70. 
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done by the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq),63 or whether 
to assume a more decentralized, bottom-up approach as advocated 
herein.64  Such deficiencies in the academic literature should be 
rectified.  Conversely, there should be more pragmatically focused 
academic discourse on “nuts and bolts” formalist versus 
substantive issues, such as whether the rule of law can actually be 
promoted through the use of clearly defined institutions.  
Similarly, there should be more pragmatically focused dialogic 
discourse on whether the “international community” should focus 
its SRO rule of law capacity-building efforts on such substantive 
issues as the extent to which autonomy should be left to post-
conflict states to fill in the rule of law according to their own norms 
and values.  Specifically—given the lack of consensus on the 
issue—rule of law practitioners could use significantly more 
pragmatic advice on methods of determining whether SRO rule of 
law interventions, in locations such as Afghanistan, must as a 
 
63 See, e.g., CPA Order No. 11, CPA/ORD/8 June 2003/11 (regarding 
licensing telecommunications services and equipment), CPA Order No. 12, 
CPA/ORD/7 June 2003/12 (establishing a trade liberalization policy, later 
rescinded), CPA Order No. 20, CPA/ORD/14 July 2003/20 (establishing a Trade 
Bank of Iraq), CPA Order No. 22, CPA/ORD/7 August 2003/22 (creating a new 
Iraqi Army), CPA Order No. 23, CPA/ORD/7 August 2003/23 (creating a Code 
of Military Discipline for the new Iraqi Army), CPA Order No. 24, CPA/ORD/13 
August 2003/24 (establishing a Ministry of Science and Technology), CPA Order 
No. 36, CPA/ORD/3 October 2003/36 (regarding the regulation of oil 
distribution), CPA Order No. 39, CPA/ORD/19 September 2003/39 (regarding 
foreign investment), CPA Order No. 43, CPA/ORD/14 October 2003/43 (issuing 
new Iraqi Dinar Banknotes), CPA Order No. 54, CPA/ORD/24 February 2004/54 
(establishing a new trade liberalization policy), CPA Order No. 64, CPA/ORD/19 
February 2004/64 (amending Company Law No. 21 of 1997 (Iraq)), CPA Order 
No. 68, CPA/ORD/4 April 2004/68 (establishing a Ministerial Committee for 
National Security, essentially an Iraqi national intelligence service), CPA Order 
No. 74, CPA/ORD/18 April 2004/74 (establishing an interim law on securities 
markets), CPA Order No. 76, CPA/ORD/20 May 2004/76 (regarding 
consolidations of state-owned enterprises), CPA Order No. 80, CPA/ORD/26 
April 2004/80 (amending the Trademarks and Descriptions Law No. 21 of 1957 
(Iraq)), CPA Order No. 81, CPA/ORD/26 April 2004/81 (amending the Patents 
and Industrial Designs Laws and Regulations No. 65 of 1971 (Iraq)), CPA Order 
No. 83, CPA/ORD/29 April 2004/83 (amending Copyright Law No. 3 of 1971 
(Iraq)), and CPA Order No. 89, CPA/ORD/5 May 2004/89 (amending the Labor 
Code Law No. 71 of 1987 (Iraq)), available at CPA Official Documents, THE 
COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY, http://www.iraqcoalition.org/regulations 
/#Orders (last visited May 12, 2011) (cataloguing the 100 orders issued by the 
Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq, a temporary/transitional occupying force, 
between May 16, 2003 and June 28, 2004). 
64 See STROMSETH ET AL., supra note 60, at 83 (advocating for “effective local 
participation in decision-making”). 
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matter of doctrine, incorporate a broad spectrum array of 
substantive issues, including human rights.65  The “bottom line” is 
that while theoretical academic debates of “kingly” issues may be 
theoretically useful in terms of implementing rule of law systems, 
“the academy” would be of even more relevant to practitioners if it 
concentrated some of its effort on the actual methods by which 
such rule of law systems—including systems to deal with “cabbage 
issues”—come into place. 
In the meantime, there needs to be more learned examinations 
of, and discourse on, the mechanisms and personnel required for 
implementing rule of law.  In particular, practitioners need more 
pragmatically focused discourse on the meaning and 
implementation of “capacity-building.”  They need assistance on 
understanding the exact nature of rule of law capacity.  They need 
to know what it specifically takes to help build rule of law 
societies.  For example, anecdotal experience has shown that stand-
alone sector-specific trainings (e.g. coalition military and private 
military contractor trainings of judges) are not sufficient to create a 
“rule of law societies.”  In fact, when poorly timed, poorly 
coordinated, poorly conducted, and/or inadequately reinforced, 
they may actually be counter-productive to establishing a rule of 
law society.66  Likewise, anecdotal experience demonstrates that 
rule of law capacity-building needs to be long-term and embedded 
in processes that are owned and driven by external as well as 
internal actors (such as universities and law schools).  In short, 
capacity-building needs to be context-specific and more facilitative 
rather than interventionist.  And yet, millions of dollars and years 
of effort have been expended on such means and mechanisms as 
military/contractor-driven rule of law trainings of judicial and 
 
65 Id. at 71. 
66 See Hoekstra & Tucker, supra, note 3, at 19, 22. 
[P]remature uncoordinated, ill-executed, and poorly articulated 
international SRO responses may also backfire since they can 
unreasonably raise local expectations (which cannot possibly be met) and 
lead to the opinion that the international community may have the 
wherewithal to help, but not the inclination….  Simply put, in the past, 
when nonkinetic stabilization and reconstruction efforts have been 
placed under the operational control of the military, interagency civil 
engagement and reconstruction priorities have often been left unrealized. 
For this reason, in future SROs, as soon as security allows, it will be vital 
to prioritize and institutionalize State Department input into DOD 
decisionmaking. 
Id. 
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other law enforcement personnel.  So, where is the dispositive 
learned literature to validate—or not—such efforts?  And where is 
the scientific research to aid them—or other—practitioners on how 
to proceed? 
With regard to the “kings” versus “cabbages” issue, the learned 
literature is sparse.  Much more could – and should – be written on 
the subject.  Until that time, the United Nations Development 
Programme (“UNDP”) provides a good starting point for 
evaluating the issue by defining capacity-building as, “the process 
through which individuals, organizations and societies obtain, 
strengthen and maintain the capabilities to set and achieve their 
own development objectives over time.”67  The UNDP goes on to 
highlight three levels of capacity:  1) the enabling environment; 2) 
the organizational level; and 3) the individual level.68  Significantly, 
the UNDP notes that capacity at the individual level is the most 
important and most neglected of these levels.  Perhaps more 
learned dialogic discourse would help prove—or disprove—this 
assertion. 
5. CONCLUSION—FACILITATING THE DEVELOPMENT OF RULE OF 
LAW CULTURES 
“[T]he rule of law is a matter of cultural commitments as much 
as a matter of formal institutions and legal codes…..”69  Thus, 
facilitating the development of effective governance and the rule of 
law requires going beyond traditional academic and top-down 
approaches that mainly focus on centralized national level legal 
forms and institutions.  Further, successful governance and rule of 
law capacity-building requires a willingness to focus on long-term 
initiatives—not short term exit strategies.  And even more 
significantly, successful governance and rule of law capacity-
building programs must provide at least some significant level of 
focus on “cabbage issues,” such as civil law (vice criminal law) 
enhancement (i.e., business law, family law, property law & etc., 
rather than a nearly exclusive enhancement of criminal law 
systems), enhancing legal education, creating for-profit and pro 
 
67 UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME, FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS: 
THE UNDP APPROACH TO SUPPORTING CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT 3 (June 2009), 
available at http://content.undp.org/go/cms-service/download/asset/?asset_id 
=2072460. 
68 Id. at 5. 
69 STROMSETH ET AL., supra note 60, at 325. 
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bono community-based/university-based law clinics, and the 
linking of formal legal institutions (including universities) with 
traditional civil society organizations and practices. 
 In the meantime, the importance of including civil society 
organizations in this process cannot be over stated.  Such 
organizations help bridge the gap between formal legal institutions 
and local populations.  They can serve as watchdogs to help keep 
formal legal institutions honest and ensure institutional injustices 
are ameliorated.70  This said, since civil society organizations vary 
enormously in quality, it is also important to identify—and then 
communicate with—well functioning organizations that “can help 
identify needs, disseminate information, prevent disputes . . . and 
be a locus for community-based initiatives.”71  Likewise, other 
quasi-official groups, such as local bar associations and judges 
associations, can also be helpful in strengthening rule of law in 
post-conflict societies.  These organizations—if appropriately 
resourced and monitored—can provide training programs, judicial 
exchanges, and codes of conduct for their members.  However, 
their ultimate value depends on their accountability, transparency, 
and commitment to high ethical standards.72  The “international 
community” can play an important role in ensuring they do so. 
Finally, for any governance and rule of law capacity-building 
SRO to be a success, enhancing the legal education capacity of the 
“client state” is critical.  This is particularly true with regard to 
long-term sustainability issues.  In many post-conflict settings, law 
schools and the legal profession are in need of significant reform.  
Participatory education and improved integration between law 
schools, lawyers, legally oriented NGOs, and the larger local and 
“international” communities can help to create a stable legal 
system.  There are many things the “international community” can 
do to help achieve this goal.  Some examples include expanding 
participatory training and improving integration of law schools 
with legal professions, NGOs, and the larger society.  Producing 
publications on human rights and international law can also bring 
more awareness to these issues and allow citizens to devise feasible 
ways to address these topics.  The expansion and improvement of 
law libraries can assist young lawyers in engaging directly with the 
 
70 Id. at 330. 
71 Id. at 331. 
72 Id. at 332–33. 
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law.  Moreover, assisting law schools to develop a suitable 
curriculum that reflect local sensibilities, while at the same time 
fitting into the larger international context, can lead to long term 
sustainability.73 
The “bottom line” is that the “international community” and 
“academy” must put local people at the center of governance and 
rule of law capacity-building development.  It is not sufficient, 
acceptable, or sustainable to design policies and programs in 
isolation of local citizens.  Clearly, international government 
institutions and academia will—and should—debate such “kingly 
issues” as the forms of democracy, federalism, and 
constitutionalism that would best serve post-conflict societies.  
However, they—we—should also be mindful that such “kingly 
ideals” are the end state—not a genesis—of successful engagement. 
 
73 Id. at 333–34. 
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